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Japanese Participants at the International 
Studies Conference and the Institute of 
Pacific Relations in the Twenty Years’ 
Crisis 
 
The proposed project for the research at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) was 
“a re-assessment of the discourse of the International in the twentieth century.” 
It was to examine how the idea of the “International” was formed. By the 
“International,” I meant the counter-communist notion of the “International,” 
which became the core of what we often term the “liberal international order” of 
the twentieth century. This research now forms a part of my broader book project.1 
What follows here are my findings on one of the three focuses in this recent 
research at the RAC, which were also synthesized with documents from the 
League of Nations Archives and the Unesco Archives, and my thoughts on them.   
 
This writing takes place in the unfolding of multiple crises. We are in the middle 
of the historic global pandemic crisis, which halted an ever-globalizing era of 
human history. Concurrently, we are experiencing an ongoing crisis of the globe, 
climate change, and that of parliamentary democracy. We are also in the middle 
of global BLM movements, while observing increasing power of non-democratic 
regimes. It is hard not to reflect on what the officers at the Rockefeller Foundation 
(RF)2 were going through in the 1930s-1940s, when they watched their era’s own 
crises unfolding, and were faced with “sinking international organizations,” with 
which they “share[d] their objectives and admire[d] their work.”3 What did they 




The International Studies Conference, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and the Notion of 
the International 
 
For my examination on the notion of the “International,” I identified the 
International Studies Conference (ISC: 1928-1954) as a case study. The ISC4 was 
one of the programs of the International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation 
(ICIC) of the League of Nations, which aimed to establish “scientific study of 
international relations,” with an ultimate goal to achieve peace of the world.5 It 
was, therefore, not an organization, but a series of conferences. The ISC was 
administered by the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC: 
1926-46) in Paris, which was an executive office of the ICIC.  
 
According to Rietzler, while the Rockefeller Foundation (or Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial) had been interested in projects in Europe in the field of 
international relations before the ISC began, it had a negative view of the IIIC 
before 1930.6 Only after the fifth ISC annual conference in May 1932 did the RF 
become aware of the IIIC’s project, the ISC. Having recognized its value then, the 
RF gave the first of a series of grants to the IIIC for the ISC, starting with $1500 
in 1932. In 1935, the RF’s Social Sciences division narrowed its scope to three 
areas, namely social security, public administration, and international relations, 
and identified the ISC as one of the most significant projects in Europe in the field 
of international relations. Accordingly, in 1935, the Rockefeller Foundation 
decided to give a substantial grant for the ISC ($30,000), followed by $40,000 in 
1936, and $100,000 in 1937, making the ISC as the RF’s “European flagship 
programme.”7 Rietzler points out that this came at a critical time for the IIIC, 
when the League cut the budget line for the IIIC by 40%, and the French 
government had taken similar steps.8  
 
Accordingly, Rietzler maintains that the Rockefeller Foundation “moulded” the 
ISC into something that had little trace of its initial form. 9  She nonetheless 
suggests the RF’s influence in more normative terms, and points to its complex 
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relationship with the US government, at least in the non-war period. As for the 
following years, Parmar argues more strongly that the RF was important in the 
rise of the discipline of international relations (IR) in the US in the 1950s, and 
that this contributed to an expansion of US hegemonic power in the Cold War 
era.10  
 
Indeed, international relations (IR) scholars have now well-acknowledged the 
significance of the International Studies Conference and the Rockefeller 
Foundation in making the discipline of IR, especially in the US (and, therefore, in 
the world).11 Beyond this disciplinary history, the ISC also presents a crucial case 
study for the formation of the notion of the “International.” Along with 
international law (IL), IR has been a most important field of knowledge which 
shaped this notion. Moreover, ISC conferences were a rare site in the inter-war 
period, where pioneering key figures in the field of international affairs, with 
diverse disciplinary backgrounds in various countries (largely in Europe and the 
US), gathered annually in 1928–1939 (and three times more in 1945–1954). As 
they discussed what should be this “scientific study of international relations,” 
they were demarcating what was “legitimate” or “appropriate” as being 
“international.” And this would define not only the academic discourse 
(disciplines) on the “International,” but also how politicians and diplomats 




Asia for the International Studies 
Conference, the Institute of Pacific 
Relations, and the Rockefeller 
Foundation 
 
I had three focuses for my research on the International Studies Conference, 
distinct from most existing works on the ISC, for my recent research at RAC. First, 
I wanted to look at the involvement of those from Asia, especially Japan, and if 
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possible, China and India. Many relevant historical works on international 
organizations, including on the League of Nations, IR, IL, or the ISC so far had 
been largely focused on Euro-American contexts. A critical perspective on the 
formation of the notion of the “International” needs to encompass non-Euro-
American sources and experiences, as well as their interactions with Euro-
American counterparts.  
 
Second, I wanted to examine whether, or how the International Studies 
Conference dealt with Asia as a subject of study. Third, this question has 
prompted me to examine the relationship between the ISC and the Institute of 
Pacific Relations (IPR, 1925–60), for which the RF was also the main funder until 
its end in 1960.12 Long and Riemens refer to the IPR’s influence in the ISC,13 and 
Pemberton argues that the IPR, not the ISC, pioneered “the study of international 
relations on an international basis,” and the ISC modelled after it.14 The ISC also 
adopted the IPR’s conference format. Furthermore, Rietzler suggests that the 
Rockefeller Foundation pushed the politicization of the ISC, because it wanted to 
mould the ISC into an IPR model, which the RF regarded as a success case.15 
 
Yet, the Institute of Pacific Relations pioneered not only international research 
programs on international relations, but also those on what were soon called “area 
studies” (Asian studies and Pacific studies).16 Distinct from the previous “Oriental 
studies” that focused on classics and literature, IPR research programs examined 
contemporary economic, social, political, and strategic issues in regional 
relations, utilizing social scientific methods and frameworks, Asian languages, 
and field work. Unlike the ISC, the IPR was an international non-governmental 
organization in Asia and the Pacific region, with a permanent secretariat (the 
International Secretariat of the IPR, ISIPR). Like the ISC, the IPR held 
international conferences (thirteen times between 1925 and 1958), but mainly in 
its region. And unlike the ISC, members from countries in Asia, such as Japan, 
China, and later India, played a significant part in its international conferences 
and research programs.17 How did the “fields of knowledge” of, and their experts 
at, the ISC and the IPR intersect? 
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Japanese Participants at the ISC 
Conferences in 1928-1939 
 
While both the International Studies Conference (1928-54) and the Institute of 
Pacific Relations (1925-60), therefore, were regarded as projects in the field of 
international relations and funded by the RF, one significant difference was active 
involvements of the participants from Asia in the IPR. The Japanese Council of 
the IPR (JCIPR), formed in 1926, especially had been an enthusiastic partner of 
American experts who articulated a vision of the “Pacific community” of political 
equals in the IPR. Its members contributed substantially to IPR conferences and 
international research projects, except for the period between 1939 and 1945.18 
Although Long suggests the ISC’s global scope, 19 the organization was largely 
Europe-centred with strong US involvement, not only in its memberships,20 but 
also in its scope of the selected topics and research projects. Did the Japanese 
participate in ISC conferences? If so, when? And who participated? How did they 
interact with their counterparts from Europe and the US? 
 
Although information on Japanese participation in ISC conferences was scarce, 
after synthesizing the documents at the RAC with those at the other archives and 
other sources, a certain picture began to emerge. 
 
 
1929-1933: Trying to Make the Japanese 
Council of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations as a “National” Member 
Institute for the ISC  
 
The International Studies Conference started essentially as a European project 
with involvement and support of US experts and philanthropic funds. No non-
Euro-Americans were in a scope or involved in the first ISC conference in Berlin  
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in 1928, and there was no reference to Japan or any Japanese institution in its 
conference planning documents, invitations, or proceedings. 21  The ISC’s 
pretention was, however, “global,” as its founding figures believed Europe still 
remained the center of the world.22 At the same time, as the League’s Council 
could claim a “global” status because it included Japan as its member, the ISC 
wanted to be a conference of a global reach, and intended to include countries in 
other regions, such as Japan, China, Australia, and New Zealand.23  
 
The first Japanese participation at the ISC was recorded at the second ISC 
conference in London in 1929. Then, one Japanese individual, Hirai Sanji 
(surname first for Japanese names) of “Tokyo University,” was listed as a 
“representative of Japanese institutions for the scientific study of IR.”24 There is 
little information on what led to this first “participation.” Little is also known 
about Hirai, other than that he was an economist, and most likely from Tokyo 
Imperial University. Why he was “selected” is not clear, either. Judging from a 
pattern emerging in the following years, it may be because he “happened to be” in 
London for his own studies or for other conference obligations. Despite rapid 
development of the steamship liners, a trip to Europe was still a major financial 
and time commitment for any employer or employee in Japan. 
 
Nevertheless, by the 1910s, prominent Japanese experts had been participating in 
international conferences, be it in the field of medicine, law, geography, geology, 
mathematics, chemistry, or biology, often with a subsidy of the Japanese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) or other relevant ministries. Moreover, these experts 
were closely engaged with the development of their fields in Euro-America. The 
Japanese Society of International Law (JSIL, established in 1897), for example, 
started its own journal, Kokusaihō zasshi [Journal of International Law], in 
1902,25  and it recorded close communications between the JSIL and the two 
leading “international” organizations, namely the Institut de Droit International 
(IDI, founded in Ghent in 1873) and the International Law Association (ILA, 
founded in Brussels in 1873), including the detailed agenda of their respective 
annual conferences. While JSIL members discussed these agendas in detail in the 
journal, the journal also recorded the participation of JSIL members at these 
conferences. In addition, the JSIL had good contacts with the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (CEIP: 1910-) soon after the latter was 
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established. The CEIP began to contribute funds to the journal after 1913, because 
it saw this journal as the only one in the field in the Orient, and it had an important 
mission to disseminate an idea of international law in this “rising Oriental power” 
and in the region.26 
 
Unlike the JCIPR’s participation in the Institute of Pacific Relations conference 
in the same period, Japanese participation in the International Studies 
Conference in 1929, however, was not regarded as proper “national” 
representation by the ISC. For this to occur, ISC executives had to evaluate the 
quality of key institutions in Japan to see whether they were competent to conduct 
credible research in the field of international relations and whether they could do 
so on a long-term basis. The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation 
(IIIC), the administrative office for the ISC, was keen for those institutions to form 
a “national coordinating committee,” which could coordinate research projects in 
that country for ISC conferences.  
 
For a country where a representative institution or a national coordinating 
committee was yet to be formed, the IIIC needed to identify such an institution. 
In October 1930, Werner Picht, head of the university relations section of the IIIC, 
contacted “Aoki” at a hotel in Paris, and asked to meet him on the following day 
to discuss Japanese collaboration with the International Studies Conference, as 
well as the “handbook of non-partisan references centres.”27 This was most likely 
Aoki Setsuichi, director of the Tokyo Office of the Information Section of the 
League of Nations in 1925-1933,28 who must have been visiting Paris for League-
related business. In Paris, there was the Japanese Empire’s Office for the League 
of Nations, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had set up in 1921. 29  The 
Japanese ambassador to France was in charge of this office, and also represented 
Japan at League’s Council and Assembly meetings. 
 
What Aoki did in Japan for facilitating Japanese participation in the ISC is not 
clear, as no development was recorded in 1931 and 1932. Aoki was indeed in the 
milieu of those who were interested in international (including regional) affairs 
in Tokyo. They were a small group of the imperial/national male elite from the 
top  universities  and  the high offices across the Japanese empire.   By 1930,  they  
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were clustered mainly in three organizations, all headquartered in the imperial 
metropole, Tokyo. These organizations were: the JSIL (1897-), the Japanese 
Association of the League of Nations (JALN, 1920-), and the JCIPR (1926-), with 
respective memberships overlapping substantially.30 Aoki worked closely with the 
JALN for propaganda (public education) of the League, but knew key members of 
these organizations. It is most likely that he mentioned about the ISC to these 
members. 
 
All these members, including Aoki, however, had a bigger issue to focus on in 
September 1931–March 1933: the diplomatic crisis created by the Japanese army 
garrison’s aggression in Northeastern China (Manchuria) and the Japanese 
government’s response to the League’s assemblies, its inquiry mission, and its 
final resolutions. Their expertise in international law, international politics (a 
newly emerging academic field in Japan in the 1920s-1930s), international 
organizations, Euro-America, and Asia, was vital for the Japanese government in 
this crisis. Only a few of these experts voiced criticism of the Japanese 
government’s position to justify the Japanese military actions and the subsequent 
military occupation of Manchuria and a part of Inner Mongolia, as a majority tried 
to defend the official stance.31 
 
A significant new development in Japanese participation at the International 
Studies Conference nonetheless was recorded in late January 1933. Some contact 
must have, therefore, occurred in 1932 at the height of this Manchurian crisis, and 
here, it became clear that the IIIC’s contact was the JCIPR. Shortly before the 
League’s Assembly would vote for the resolution of the crisis against Japan’s 
wishes, the fourth executive committee of the ISC noted that the National 
Coordination Committee for the ISC would probably be formed in Japan in the 
spring of 1933. The minutes stated: a special effort would be made [by a Japanese 
group] to submit a memo on “the State and Economic Life” [the theme of the sixth 
ISC conference, scheduled in London for 29 May-2 June 1933]; it was hoped that 
[the Japanese group] could participate the conference. It further noted: the ISC 
had wanted Japanese participation at the ISC for some time, which seemed to be 
now assured; when the coordinating committee was formed, it should be admitted 
as a member of the conference; and the executive committee [of the ISC] asked 
the IIIC to inform this to the JCIPR.32 Then, two months later (late March 1933), 
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the Japanese government declared a withdrawal from the League (to become 
effective in March 1935).  
 
No Japanese participant was recorded at the 1933 ISC conference, but its report 
noted that the conference decided that “the Japanese Council of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations [JCIPR] alone could be regarded as qualified for admission to 
the conference.”33 It appears, therefore, that the ISC decided that rather than 
waiting for the national coordinating committee to be formed in Japan, it would 
give the JCIPR a status of the “national” representative institution. This meant 
that the ISC understood that the JCIPR cleared the required conditions of 
scholarly standards and the capacity to sustain the necessary level of research. 
The JCIPR indeed consolidated prominent experts of the fields relevant for 
examining international and regional affairs with an extensive membership 
overlap with the JSIL and the JALN. ISC executive members must have been 
informed about the JCIPR by the representatives of the IPR at the ISC. They 
included John B. Condliffe (research secretary of the ISIPR, 1927-1931) who 
attended the ISC conference in 1930 and 1933 (and later, he would serve as 
general rapporteur in charge of the research programs for the ISC conferences of 
1938 and 1939), and Edward Carter (director of the American Council of the IPR 
in New York, later appointed as secretary general of the International Secretariat 
of the Institute of Pacific relations at the coming IPR conference in Banff in 
August 1933).34 While Carter was involved in the ISC during this period, he was 
also based in New York, and had close contacts with the Rockefeller Foundation 
headquarters there.  His skill at securing RF funding for the IPR gave him power 
at the ISIPR. Closely examining these funding applications by the IPR on a regular 
base, the RF also had a good understanding of IPR’s international activities, 
including the JCIPR, while John D. Rockefeller 3rd participated in the Kyoto IPR 
conference in 1929. 
 
This “almost done” stage of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations becoming the national unit for the International Studies Conference in 
mid-1933, however, seemed to be suspended for half a year, as the fifth executive 
meeting of the ISC in January 1934 recorded “renewed” negotiations with the 
JCIPR. It then noted almost a repeated decision that if there were no further 
11 
 
organizations, the JCIPR “should be admitted to the conference in its individual 
capacity.”35  
 
Although International Studies Conference documents did not reference it, which 
itself is remarkable, a particular question remains. Was this back step related to 
the Japanese government’s notification of its withdrawal from the League in 
March 1933? If so, why did it not affect the ISC’s decision in June 1933, but did so 
later in the year? Japan’s withdrawal was to become effective only in two years’ 
time in 1935, and this meant little change of Japan’s presence at the League in 
1933-35. Even after 1935, Japan also remained in “technical committees” of the 
League, especially its Permanent Mandate Commission, until it began war with 
China in 1937.  
 
The years 1933-35 were a significant transitional period for Japan’s foreign policy, 
and it will be wrong to see it as the beginning of “isolation” from the world. Rather, 
during this time, the Japanese government prepared for diplomacy without and 
outside of the League after 1935. This was why Hirota Kōki, who became foreign 
minister in September 1933 (and kept this post until spring 1936), strengthened 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ capacity for news and cultural propaganda, 
launched “cultural diplomacy,” and shifted the center for Euro-American 
propaganda from Geneva to New York. 36  It is nonetheless possible that this 
transition of Japan’s status at the League and its foreign policy created some 
confusion for the executives of both the International Institute of Intellectual 
Cooperation and the ISC. 
 
In 1933, however, foreign policy makers in Japan continued to regard JCIPR’s 
participation in IPR conferences as important. To be sure, the circumstances 
surrounding the JCIPR were changing. Reflecting tension between the Japanese 
government and the League, as well as with the US administration, the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Police had described the JCIPR as “an enemy sympathizer” at the 
beginning of 1933. 37  In May 1933, however, Matsuoka Yōsuke, who was the 
plenipotentiary chief of the Japanese diplomatic delegation at the League’s 
Assembly earlier in February, wrote to Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya. He noted, 
“Having discussed the matter with prominent people in London, New York, and 
Honolulu, I am convinced that Japan will need to take great interest in [the IPR], 
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and I hope that you will understand this” and would “assist in sending powerful 
delegates to the coming IPR conference [in Banff in August 1933].”38 Although 
Matsuoka led the Japanese delegation’s “exit” from the League’s Assembly (as 
instructed by the Japanese government), he urged that Japan needed to be 
engaged with these non-governmental international conferences, and especially 
IPR’s conferences. At the same time, for him, the objective of sending Japanese 
participants to these conferences was not to maintain “liberal,” “scientific,” and 
“impartial” exchanges of the views to solve the problems which challenged peace 
and security of the region, but to “make Japanese points of view understood” 
among leading experts of international affairs in the countries which mattered. 
 
 
1934-39: The JCIPR and the ISC 
 
Possibly prompted by Matsuoka’s suggestion in May 1933, and then Foreign 
Minister Hirota’s “new engagement” with the world after September 1933, 
Japanese members attended ISC conferences every year between 1934 and 1939. 
Contrary to the “decisions” of the ISC in 1933 and 1934, however, the Japanese 
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations did not seem to have gained a formal 
member institution status at the ISC in 1934-39. 
 
Was it because of Japan’s non-member status at the League? Up until early 1936, 
however, the International Studies Conference appears to have maintained 
negotiations on the JCIPR’s admission. The JCIPR was referenced in the 
conference participant list for the seventh ISC conference (on collective security) 
in Paris in 1934.39 The seventh executive meeting of the ISC in December 1934 
noted that the ISC was in contact with the JCIPR; its members attended the ISC 
conference in Paris in 1934, but JCIPR’s affiliation was pending. The meeting 
asked the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation to invite not the 
JCIPR, but “a competent Japanese scholar or group of scholars to submit a memo 
on Collective Security [the theme of the eighth ISC conference in London in 1935] 
and to take part” in the conference.40 The draft agenda of the eighth executive 
meeting  of  the  ISC  in mid-1936 noted that “the institute [the IIIC] was inviting  
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the Japanese institutions and scholars to take part in the study on ‘Peaceful 
Change’” [the theme of the ninth ISC conference, scheduled in Madrid, for 27-30 
May 1936].41 The French version of the resumé of deliberations of that meeting 
indicated that the ISC was still in contact with the JCIPR, discussing its admission 
as an ISC member institute. 42  The fact that the IIIC was trying hard to get 
Japanese (and Chinese) involvements in the ISC in this period was also seen in 
the correspondence between the Rockefeller Foundation’s Paris office and its New 
York office. A few days after the above-mentioned eighth executive meeting at the 
IIIC in Paris, Tracy Kittredge at the RF Paris office wrote to Sydnor Walker, 
associate director of the RF’s Social Sciences division, that the IIIC appointed 
Fergus Chalmers-Wright as a “means of assuring cooperation from Far Eastern 
countries” on the ISC.43 Walker’s response suggested that the issue was a concern 
for the RF.44  
 
The ninth ISC conference agenda of May 1936, however, noted that “invitations 
to attend the 9th ISC have also been accepted by individual scholars and experts 
in Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway, Portugal and Sweden,” with no reference 
to the JCIPR. 45  For the following ISC conferences of 1937, 1938, and 1939, 
Japanese participants did not appear in the formal lists of the conference 
participants but, instead, recorded in other conference documents or in 
correspondences of the officers of the RF as participants attending in a “personal 
capacity.”46  
 
What prevented the JCIPR from admission as an ISC member institute in 1935–
36 may be partly due to the re-organization of the JCIPR in 1935. The change 
reflected the strong “public diplomacy” initiative of Foreign Minister Hirota in the 
post-League era. In May 1935, shortly after Japan’s withdrawal from the League 
became effective, the government decided to “merge” the JCIPR into the Japanese 
International Association (JIA), and this took place at the end of the year. The JIA 
was formally the Japanese Association of the League of Nations (JALN). When 
Japan’s withdrawal became effective, it was not dissolved, but reorganized with a 
new name and new objective. Its objective changed from “promoting the spirit of 
the League” to “promoting friendly relations and cooperation among nations and 
contributing to the establishment of international justice and the realization of 
international peace.”47  
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This merger was a step towards making the Japanese Council of the Institute for 
Pacific Relations a part of Japan’s cultural diplomacy/propaganda and 
intelligence machinery, although government pressure became more blatant after 
the outbreak of Japan’s war with China in mid-1937. To be sure, some government 
officials thought the JCIPR (now a section within the Japanese International 
Association) should withdraw from the Institute of Pacific Relations’ 
international conferences and research programs. Shortly after the sixth IPR 
conference at Yosemite in 15-29 August 1936, Amō Eiji, then director of the 
Department of Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told the director of 
the JIA that the JCIPR should withdraw from the IPR, which he saw an 
organization of “white supremacists.”48 
 
JCIPR members, however, continued engagement and communication with the 
International Secretariat of the Institute for Pacific Relations, even after having 
learned about its new international research project on the Sino-Japanese War in 
early 1938. They attended a study conference at Edward Carter’s farmhouse in 
Lee, Massachusetts, trying to modify the key points of the project in August 1938, 
and then at Princeton from December 1938 to January 1939. Having failed that, 
the JCIPR finally notified the Pacific Council, the IPR’s executive body, in July 
1939 that it would withdraw from the ISIPR’s Inquiry project. 49  The JCIPR 
instead conducted its own “inquiry” on the war. The IPR’s Yosemite Conference 
in August 1936, therefore, became the last IPR conference the JCIPR attended 
before the war. The next IPR conference the JCIPR would attend was the eleventh 
conference held in Lucknow, India, in 1950, when Japan was still under the Allied 
occupation. 
 
Japanese regular participation at ISC conferences, therefore, began after 1934, 
and largely in the period when the JCIPR was merged with the JIA, or coopted 
into the state machinery, and when it stopped participating IPR conferences. To 
be sure, the JCIPR was never independent from the government from its 
beginning in 1926. Although it was not revealed publicly, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs gave subsidies to the JCIPR for its overseas conference participation. The 
JCIPR’s  holding  of   the  third conference  in Kyoto  in 1929  would not have been  
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possible without the support from MOFA as well as from major conglomerates.50 
Its overseas participants were given smooth custom services and free railway 
tickets across the Japanese empire, including Korea and Manchuria. Although 
many stressed the significance of “non-governmentality” of the IPR then, anyone, 
who thought these massive logistic arrangements were possible without extensive 
official involvements, would have been deluded. Furthermore, JCIPR members 
were imperial/national male elite, who felt a mission and duty for the nation and 
empire, and except for a few, many were to defend official policies. Their 
expertise, language skill, and knowledge of and familiarity with foreign countries, 




Who were the Japanese Participants at the 
ISC, 1934-39? 
 
If the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations did not become an 
ISC’s national institution, who attended ISC conferences from 1934 to 1939? 
Through what channel was this arranged? What impact did their experience at 
ISC conference have in their understanding of the “International”? And were ISC 
conferences a site for “public diplomacy” for them?  
 
In the 1930s, a new generation of members was emerging at the JCIPR and in the 
field of international politics, and although they were not regarded as one 
coherent group, I have used the term, “statist reformism” (kakushin-shugi), to 
capture a certain intellectual and ideological trend among them.51 It was a statist 
version of welfare “liberalism,” which argued for state-led reforms for the whole 
of society. Recognizing the problem of parliamentary democracy, some were 
influenced by the Fabians and/or other social democratic thought, and argued for 
guild socialism. Although they were largely anti-fascist, many identified Japan as 
a “have-not country,” similar to Germany and Italy, and argued for the need to 
reform the current international order, which they saw was dominated by the 
Anglo-American powers. This was why German “renovationist” scholars of 
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international law and geopolitics, such as Carl Schmitt, became influential among 
them. In the mid- to late 1930s, this trend was strongly evident among a younger 
generation of JCIPR members, some of whom were to be involved in policy 
formations of the New Order (domestic) and the East Asia New Order as members 
of the brain trust of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro in 1937-39, and 1940–41.52 
These JCIPR members included Rōyama Masamichi (1895-1980), Matsumoto 
Shigeharu (1899-1989), and Matsukata Saburō (1899-1973). 
 
Uramatsu Samitarō (1901–1981), whose name was listed in a note of the 
participants of the eighth ISC conference in London in 1935, but not in the formal 
list,53  was one of these young JCIPR members. After graduating from Tokyo 
Commerce University (now Hitotsubashi University), he became a journalist, and 
joined the JCIPR as one of the secretaries for the Kyoto IPR Conference in 1929 
with Matsumoto and Matsukata. After the conference, Uramatsu joined the 
Political and Economic Research Institute with Rōyama and Matsumoto,54 and 
later was involved in Konoe’s brain trust. In 1935, he was most likely studying at 
a university in London.  
 
Names of the other participants who attended ISC conferences in 1934-39, 
however, suggest different groups, although connected to the JCIPR, from these 
younger JCIPR members. One was a group of established international law 
professors, based more at the Japanese Society of International Law, and more 
familiar with Europe than the US, and another was that of company executives 
who were posted in Europe.  
 
For the ISC conference (on collective security) in Paris in May 1934, three 
Japanese were listed: Tachi Sakutarō, Asano Ryōzō, and Komatsu Takashi. 55 
Asano Ryōzō (1889-1965) was a Harvard graduate (1912), and the second son of 
the founder of the Asano Conglomerate. After his father passed away in 1930, he 
became virtually in charge of the conglomerate. These conglomerates, such as 
Asano, Yasuda, Sumitomo, Mitsui, Furukawa, as well as Yokohama Specie Bank, 
had been major donors to the JCIPR and the JALN.56 Asano first worked at the 
San Francisco branch of the Oriental Steamship Company (in the Asano group). 
Back in  Japan,  he  entered  into the   management of   various companies in the  
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group. In 1934, he was vice president of the Asano Cement Company and 
president of the Tsurumi Shipbuilding Company (also in the group). Asano was 
to attend an annual conference of the International Labor Organization at 
Geneva, 4-23 June, as a representative of the employers in Japan.57 Most likely, 
the JCIPR and/or MOFA asked him to attend the ISC conference in Paris on 24-
26 May. Although Asano was no scholar on the theme of the ISC conference, 
collective security, he was fluent in English, had extensive knowledge of global 
and regional trading relations, which were contentious issues for peace and 
security then, and was close to policy makers in Japan. He probably fitted well as 
a type of “men of public affairs” whom the Rockefeller Foundation was keen to 
involve more at the ISC.  
 
Komatsu Takashi was director of the Tsurumi Shipbuilding Company, and was 
accompanying Asano to the ILO conference.58 Komatsu was, however, more than 
a minder of Asano, and probably he had more relevant expertise (naval 
disarmament) to the ISC conference theme. Graduated Harvard one year before 
Asano in 1911, he became the secretary to the president of the Oriental Steamship 
Company, before he was posted as the head of the New York branch of the 
company. He then joined the shipbuilding company. In the 1920s, he attended as 
a member of the Japanese diplomatic mission at the Washington Conference 
(1921-2) and the Geneva Disarmament Conference (1927).59 
 
Tachi Sakutarō (1874-1943) represented another group of Japanese participants 
at the International Studies Conference; he was an international law expert and 
member of the Japanese Society of International Law. Tachi also attended the ISC 
conferences in 1936, as well. He was professor of international law at Tokyo 
Imperial University until he retired in March 1934. Tachi was a founding member 
of the JSIL in 1897, when he just graduated from the Faculty of Law (Political 
Science) of the university and started graduate studies in international public law. 
He remained a central figure at the JSIL throughout his life. After studying in 
Europe in 1900-4, Tachi was appointed as professor at the university in 1904, and 
taught diplomatic history, and then international law after 1905. He was a prolific, 
influential writer. Tachi’s works could be summarized as contributing to the new 
study field of international politics from a perspective of international law. 
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Although Tachi was formally appointed as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in December 1934 after his retirement from the university, like many 
international law experts at the JSIL, he had played this advisory role throughout 
his academic career. Tachi did so in a number of ways. First, as an expert member 
of the diplomatic delegations, he advised the government at major inter-
governmental conferences, such as the Conference on International Law on 
Armed Conflicts at Sea in London in 1909, the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the 
Washington Conference in 1921-1922, and the Hague Conference for the 
Codification of International Law in 1930. Second, he regularly advised MOFA on 
foreign policies. Third, he tried to insert “Japanese interests” into the codification 
process of international law.60 Fourth, he often “legally” defended governmental 
policies to experts and the public in Japan and overseas, such as at the time of the 
Manchurian Crisis.61 
 
A full analysis of the significance of Tachi’s interactions at the ISC conferences in 
1934 and 1936 is yet to be conducted.62 It is, however, important to note that in 
1934-43, he worked within MOFA, and his advice was well sought after by high 
officials.63 In 1934 and 1936, the ISC was a useful place for him to know how 
experts were understanding current international affairs, especially European 
politics and the League. This information was probably more useful for MOFA 
than Tachi conducting Japanese propaganda at the ISC.  
 
As it was the case for Asano, the International Studies Conference attendance was 
an “extra” to Tachi’s “main” objective. The Japanese Society of International 
Law’s journal recorded that Tachi had left Japan at the end of March 1934 “in 
order to attend the [Institut de Droit International’s] conference” at Brussels in 
that year, and reported about this conference to JSIL members in November 1934, 
upon his return.64 In 1936, the only record in the journal was his talk at the JSIL 
meeting in October about “an international conference” he had attended in 
Europe earlier in the year. At that same meeting, another central figure of the JSIL 
(and the Japanese International Association), Yamakawa Tadao, former 
diplomat, high official, and member of the House of Peers, who was instrumental 
in the JCIPR’s merge to the JIA, also gave a talk on the Institute of Pacific 
Relations’ Yosemite Conference of 1936 which he had attended. He reported that 
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he was successful in “correcting misunderstandings of Japan” among IPR 
conference participants there.65  
 
In addition to Tachi, two other names, Tanaka Kōtarō (1890-1974) and Satō 
Junzō, appeared in a provisional list of participants for the ninth ISC conference 
on “peaceful change” in Madrid in 27-30 May 1936.66 Tanaka was a prominent 
professor of law at Tokyo Imperial University. Studied in Europe and the US, he 
became professor of commercial law at the university in 1923, became a Catholic 
in 1926, and wrote Theory of World Law [Sekai hō no ronri].67 Little information 
is available about Satō, other than that he was director of la Maison du Japan de 
la Cité internationale universitaire de Paris, which was established in 1929 by a 
Japanese business man initially for lodging Japanese students.68 He most likely 
had close contacts with academics at the University of Paris, the International 
Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Japanese diplomats, and the Japanese 
business community in Paris. 
 
The tenth ISC conference on “peaceful change” was held in Paris on 28 June-3 
July 1937, ending only a few days before the first clash between Japan and China, 
which was to lead to the second Sino-Japanese War. Although the conference list 
only mentioned that Japanese observers attended the conference, 69  the JSIL 
journal recorded on these participants in its newsletter. Here, one can see a 
similar pattern of the Japanese group as in 1934 and 1936: a senior and close-to-
government JSIL member who was also attending an international law 
conference. Yamada Saburō (1869-1965), professor of international private law at 
Tokyo Imperial University, and a founding member of the JSIL, reported to the 
JSIL meeting on 27 October 1937 (Japan was already at war with China) on the 
ISC conference. Yamada noted that he attended an annual meeting of the 
International Law Association in Luxembourg on 30 August-4 September, as well 
as the ISC conference on peaceful change at the University of Paris and the second 
anti-nuclear law conference at The Hague. At the ISC conference, he was in the 
group on “resource problems,” and argued for the abolishment of discriminatory 
tariffs. Yoshisaka Shunzō (1889-1958, former Japanese representative at the ILO, 
Geneva, and consultant for social affairs to the Home Ministry), also attended the 
roundtable on “population problems.”70 
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Yamada was an active contributor to the JSIL journal. He was known for his works 
on colonial law and the legal status of foreigners, including rights of Japanese 
migrants in California, and promoted Japan-French relations. He was the head of 
the law faculty at Tokyo Imperial University in 1921-24, and chancellor of Keijō 
Imperial University (Seoul) in 1931-36 in colonial Korea. In addition to his fluency 
in French, his works were relevant to the theme of the ISC in 1937.71 
 
The war with China was no obstruction to Japan’s wartime public diplomacy 
(propaganda) to Europe and North America, or in fact, it enhanced, consolidated, 
and strengthened these activities. In May 1938, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
established the Japan Institute at Rockefeller Center in Manhattan, which was 
modeled after the British Library of Information, also located in the same 
building. The Japanese government wanted to tell the “right” story of Japan’s 
policy towards China to the powers in Europe and the US, and regarded members 
of the JSIL or JCIPR as ideal publicists.72 There were only a few avenues left in 
Europe, and the ISC was one of them. 
 
In this exact timing, the eleventh ISC conference on economic policies was held 
in Prague on 23-27 May 1938, which was to prompt the most significant initiative 
for an International Studies Conference study project by a Japanese group. Here, 
it is important to note that Japan’s war with China, despite the news of its 
atrocities in Nanjing, did not seem to trouble the IIIC, ISC executives, or the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Neither was it a source for them to argue against 
Japanese participation at the ISC. In fact, they responded to this Japanese 
research initiative positively, and the RF was to provide a grant ($1000) for a 
Japanese project for 1938 through the IIIC for the first time. 
 
The person, who took this initiative, and who was in charge of communications 
with the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation in 1938-39, was Mitsui 
Takasumi (1901-1979. He was the second son of Mitsui Takamine, the tenth head 
of Mitsui Kitake that was one of the two most direct male lines of the Mitsui 
families and the most powerful in the Mitsui Conglomerate. His brother was 
Mitsui  Takakimi,  the eleventh  head  of  the  family  and   president of the Mitsui  
Conglomerate after 1933.  Mitsui Takasumi was, however, more an academic and  
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educator. He studied economics at Tokyo Imperial University and went to Oxford 
in the 1930s. There, he was involved in the Oxford Movement (1921-), which 
became the Moral Re-Armament Movement (MRA) in May 1938. It was the 
movement against fascism and communism, to achieve happiness and peace by 
reviving oneself, family, factory, company, nation, and the world by honestly 
following Christ’s teachings. Back in Tokyo, he started a small school in 1940 for 
children of the families who returned from overseas postings, which became the 
boarding school, Keimei gakuen, in 1943 with a building and a large property 
given by his brother. The school motto was “to nurture a person with a broad view, 
rich personality, original perspective, and world perspective.”73 MRA, therefore, 
had a profound impact on him. The school became his life work, and he 
maintained his commitment to MRA until the postwar period.74 
 
Mitsui attended the ISC conference in 1938.75 He was most likely still at Oxford, 
and travelled to Prague for the conference. RF officer Tracy Kittredge reported to 
Sydnor Walker, then acting director of RF’s Division of the Social Sciences, on 
“the active participation of four Japanese personalities” at the conference, 
although not naming their names.76 Kittredge noted that “after the meeting in 
Prague, the Japanese delegates draw up a complete program of preparatory 
studies on the subject of the next conference.” Condliffe, who was general 
rapporteur of the ISC conferences of 1938 and 1939, was “particularly interested 
in obtaining these Japanese studies,” and Mitsui worked out the details “after 
extensive discussion with Condliffe.”77 
 
Almost straight after the conference, Mitsui wrote to Henri Bonnet, director of the 
IIIC, on 22 June 1938, and explained the proposed preparatory studies by the 
Japanese group on the subject (economic policy) of the twelfth conference. The 
Japanese group’s plan was, first, to prepare the minimum program requested by 
Condliffe and, second, to conduct a supplementary study on the development of 
Japan’s foreign economic policy in 1870-1938. Its plan was to fund half the cost 
from local sources, and asked for the IIIC’s assistance for the other half of the cost, 
$2000.78  
 
In this proposal, former members of the Japanese Council of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations (now at the Japanese International Association) were included 
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as the collaborators for the minimum program research. They were: Rōyama 
Masamichi (Tokyo University) on “legal and administrative mechanisms which 
decide and administer foreign economic policy,” and Yanaihara Tadao (1893-
1961) on “international aspects of the recent economic policy.” Mitsui added 
Mitsubishi Economic Studies Institute and Mitsui’s Economic Research Section 
as other collaborating institutions. 79  These big conglomerates would be, 
therefore, supporting the research which was relevant to their company interests.  
 
The inclusion of Yanaihara, described as a “former professor at Tokyo University,” 
is noteworthy. Yanaihara had been a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, and 
taught colonial policies, which he took over from Nitobe Inazō when he was 
posted to the League’s under secretary in 1920. Soon after the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, however, Yanaihara published criticism of 
Japanese policy to China, as well as popular responses to the war, and in that 
December, he was forced to resign from the university. In June 1938, therefore, 
he was out of the university, but Mitsui included him as a collaborator. It indicates 
that Yanaihara continued his political economy work in this period. His research 
was indeed well regarded at the Institute of Pacific Relations; his study on the 
Japanese mandates in the Pacific, first published in Japanese in 1935, was to be 
published in English by the IPR as a part of its international research series in 
1940.80 
 
Kittredge asked Walker’s opinion on his judgment on Mitsui’s request on 30 June 
1938. 81  First, although Condliffe and Bonnet were in favour of funding a 
maximum of $1000 per year for 1938 and 1939, he felt the supplementary study 
was not essential, and thought $600 per year for two years was appropriate. 
Second, he also noted that: “[i]n the original budget of the Studies Conference, no 
allocation was envisaged for preparatory studies in Japan.”82 Kittredge made this 
point to ask Walker whether the RF should give a grant to the Japanese directly, 
because this had not been in the IIIC’s ISC budget. The point, nonetheless, 
revealed that there had been little active involvement of Japan, until Mitsui and 
his colleagues participated the conference in 1938. Maybe the topic, “economic 





On the second point, Walker preferred payment through the International 
Institute of Intellectual Cooperation83 Raymond Fosdick, president of the RF, 
agreed. There was, however, little indication that they preferred this method in 
order to avoid the RF’s connection with Japan.84 On the first point, Walker did 
not comment. Leo Gross, Secretary of the IIIC, took Kittredge’s point of dropping 
the supplementary study, but he argued that $600 was “far below the Japanese 
estimate.” Instead, Gross called for $1000 per year for two years, and added the 
support for this amount by Bonnet, Condliffe, and Malcolm Davis (director of the 
Paris office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) since 
1935.)85 In early August, Kittredge came back to Gross with the approval, and new 
grants were given to the Japanese Committee ($1000), along with those to the 
Roumanian Centre ($500), and the Swiss Committee ($1000).86 
 
No opposition about Japan’s war with China was made at the IIIC, by the ISC 
executives, the CEIP in Paris, or by the RF regarding Japanese participation at the 
ISC. Rather, they were keen to get the Japanese group involved at the twelfth ISC 
conference in 1939, now scheduled for Bergen, 27 August to 2 September 1939. 
(Nazi Germany invaded Poland one day before the ending of the conference.) 
 
This Japanese participation in 1939, however, proved difficult because of Japan’s 
strict financial restrictions. Mitsui here again worked hard, using his contacts to 
secure Japanese participation. On 12 May 1939, Mitsui, back in Tokyo, wrote a 
letter to Satō Junzō in Paris, and asked him to represent their ISC group. He 
explained that although they were “very anxious” to participate, it was impossible 
to travel abroad because of foreign exchange restrictions and little prospect of 
obtaining a required permission from the finance ministry. Mitsui stressed Satō’s 
geographical closeness to Norway and his familiarity with the ISC, rather than his 
expertise on the conference theme. His group was asking the IIIC to assist with 
his expense as they could not transfer money to him. He also told Satō that they 
were asking Viscount Kanō in London to be a possible delegate, and thus asked 
him to send the information on the ISC and the IIIC to Kanō.87  
 
Accordingly, the 1939 conference list file included Viscount Kanō Hisaakira 
(1886-1963), director of Yokohama Specie Bank (London); Satō Junzō, director 
of la Maison du Japan de la Cité internationale universitaire de Paris; and Iijima 
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Sōjirō, director of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Paris.88 Kanō was an expert of 
international finance. After graduating from the faculty of law (political science) 
at Tokyo Imperial University, he joined Yokohama Specie Bank in 1912, and spent 
most of his time at overseas postings, starting from Dairen, then to New York, 
London, Calcutta, and back to London (in 1934). In 1939, he became a Japanese 
representative director at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 89  On 
Iijima, a company record notes that he was still in France in June 1940, evacuating 
to Bordeaux with one secretary and one foreign employee.90  A full history of 
Japanese participants at the ISC, therefore, needs to be located in the context of 
networks of Japanese companies and their employees in Europe, on which little 
has been done so far.91 
 
 
As a Tentative Conclusion: Dictator 
Regimes and Public Opinion in the Crisis 
in the 1930s and in 2020 
 
My initial aim to examine the nature of Japanese participation at the 
International Studies Conference was to see the ISC’s engagement (or non-
engagement) with Asia, and how this impacted ISC’s shaping of the notion of the 
“International.” What I have pieced together here is a skeleton, and further 
information and analysis is needed to understand the nature of their participation 
and their intellectual and personal engagements and interactions. Yet, a discovery 
of their regular participation between 1934 and 1939 may make their case more 
comparable to that of German participation at the ISC after 1933. One of the 
factors for which Rietzler regards the ISC as a missed opportunity and failure was 
its accommodation of dictator propaganda, especially by the German group under 
the  Nazis  after  1933,   and,  in particular,  by a German jurist,  Friedrich Berber.  
Although Germany was one of the main national units in the beginning of the ISC 
(the first conference was hosted in Berlin, 1928), it withdrew from the ISC after 
the Nazi Germany’s withdrawal from the League. Berber, however, attended the 




ISC member in 1936.92 
 
According to Rietzler, Berber conducted Nazi propaganda through the ISC 
networks, with substantial success in influencing thoughts of prominent ISC 
participants. In the 1935 conference, he lobbied for German access to colonies, 
which matched Ribbentrop’s policy of German colonial expansion in Africa. 
Berber’s “revisionist” views on international law and international politics were 
picked up by E.H. Carr, who attended the ISC conference in 1937, and who cited 
Berber’s Security and Justice (1934) in his Twenty Years’ Crisis. Arnold Wolfers, 
a well-respected Swiss-American political scientist at the ISC, also regarded 
Berber as a “moderate,” respected his works, and “encouraged the Rockefeller 
Foundation to work with him at the ISC.”93 Berber also became even a member of 
the new board of the re-organized Geneva Research Centre (GRC) in 1936, which 
the RF wanted to be an alternative secretariat to the IIIC for the ISC.94 
 
If the ISC and the RF were too compromised by accommodating Nazi propaganda 
at the ISC and the GRC, could the same be said for Japanese participation? We 
have seen here little opposition by the IIIC, ISC executives, the CEIP in Paris, or 
the RF to Japanese participation. Rather, they were more eager to get them 
involved. It was a dilemma for the RF (and the IPR), which stressed the 
significance of ‘impartial’ and ‘scientific’ non-official exchanges of views, but 
which also wanted “impacts” in real politics. 
 
In June 1936, shortly after the ISC conference in Madrid, the RF’s main concern 
was with prevailing anxiety about the “present state of international 
relationships” in Europe. Thinking about the next conference in 1937, and 
gathering thoughts of “searching discussion” on the influence of the ISC at a 
dinner with the key ISC figures,95 Kittredge sent a long note to Walker. Here, he 
argued why the ISC need to be engaged with experts of the “dictatorial great 
powers.” Although he and the ISC key figures were thinking of Europe, and 
experts from Germany and Italy, Kittredge also included Russia and Japan as four 
“dictatorial great powers.”96 He observed: 
 
It was … the general feeling [at the Madrid Conference] that it was 
not sufficient for this examination [by experts] to proceed in those 
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countries still possessing democratic and liberal regimes … 
[E]xperts in Germany, Italy, and Russia have even greater 
influence in the councils of government than scholars in the 
liberal countries…. It was for this reason that representatives of 
the German and Italian groups were welcomed at Madrid and 
every effort made to make them feel that their full participation 
and cooperation in the international discussions of the problems 
of the Conference were vitally important to the success of these 
discussions. 
 
He then further argued:  
 
In the world as it is today organized, it is perfectly apparent that 
the governments of Japan, Russia, Germany and Italy have their 
hands the final decision as to Peace or War. They need [sic] pay 
very little attention to any opinion except those of a small group 
immediately surrounding the effective head of the respective 
governments of these countries. The group in Madrid therefore 
felt very strongly that programs designed at the education and 
direction of public opinion in the liberal countries were not in 
themselves sufficient to assure a reasonable prospect of the 
intelligent and peaceful solution of international conflicts.97 
 
Their “realistic” understanding of international affairs led them to argue for 
including experts from and research on these “dictator countries.” 
 
E.H. Carr was a strong critic of League supporters, calling them “utopians and 
idealists.” His main criticism was their almost blind reliance on “public opinion” 
as a moral power which could sanction wrong state actions. By the mid-1930s, he 
had plenty of counter-evidence for their point. He, like Berber and Carl Schmitt, 
argued that idealists had to realize that the existing international laws and 
institutions were the results of power politics in which the dominant powers tried 
to maintain their order.  
 
Yet, what is often neglected is that Carr also argued that realist positions were not 
enough either for academics and practitioners because they did not give a 
rationale or mechanism for change. The current order needed, as he continued, 
to have this venue for change in order to address injustice in it, and for this to 




What was their goal for the ISC and the RF in the late 1930s? And, are we 
experiencing a similar crisis? What Kittredge grappled in 1936 has much 
relevance to what we face now:  
 
In discussions on university teaching of international relations, it 
became perfectly clear that the proportion of the population that 
could be expected to have any intelligent and impartial 
understanding of foreign affairs was so small in every country as to 
be almost negligible... 99 
 
And educating public opinion may have an influence, but the process would be 
“slow and painful,” and meanwhile public opinion would be influenced “by 
pressure groups of various kinds, representing definite special interests.”100 
 
Standing in June 2020, there is one significant change from the 1930s: a 
demagogue is in power of a leading liberal democratic regime. How did we get 
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